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Abstract: This article presents ethnographic commentary on the dynamics between dif-
ferent ethnic and national communities in Nouakchott’s informal sector. It first gives some
background for this analysis by briefly reviewing the history of ethnic and national iden-
tity construction in Mauritania, focusing on how these different logics of inclusion and
exclusion have informed policy and practice from the colonial era up to the present day.
Ethnographic field data is then contextualised through a discussion of the role played by
›the informal‹ in Mauritania’s political economy. The analysis reveals that informality in
the context of Nouakchott should simply be understood as urban social relations in prac-
tice. This analytical lens is then deployed to evaluate how the axes of nationality, ethnicity,
and class play out in this setting. Nationality supersedes ethnicity as a mode of inclusion
and exclusion in the informal economy. Ultimately, however, these lines of differentiation
are dissolved by the overall structural position of those in the informal sector.
Keywords: Mauritania, urban informality, ethnicity, nationality, migration
How do ethnicity and nationality interact in African urban settings? In what ways do
particular lines of differentiation acquire salience at a given moment in time? This
article addresses these questions through an analysis of the informal sector in Mau-
ritania’s capital city of Nouakchott. It proceeds in two phases: first, it traces the
spatial and embodied boundaries of the Mauritanian nation-state from the colonial
era up to the present day. This historical overview also touches on processes of urban
development and the rise of the informal economy in Nouakchott. I argue that the
overwhelming prevalence of ›the informal‹ at all levels of society suggests that urban
informality in this context should be analysed simply as social relations in practice.
This historical overview and analytical lens together lay the foundation for the arti-
cle’s second objective, which is to present ethnographic commentary on the dynamics
between Mauritanian nationals and West African migrants who are semi-employed
and unemployed in Nouakchott’s urban informal sector. This means paying attention
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to which ethnic and national groups are present, their interactions with employers and
state authorities, and the contestations over public space that often result from these
interactions. The paper then turns to analysing the role of nationality in creating
psycho-social cleavages between Mauritanian nationals and West African migrants
in the informal economy. The potency of national distinction is illustrated through
a discussion of how it manifests itself within ethnic groups that exist across national
borders. The national imaginary also cuts through the commonality of experience
associated with the socioeconomic realities of the urban informal sector, resulting in
the familiar scenario of a national/other divide bisecting a common class position.
The paper concludes with a reflection on how the structural position of those within
the informal sector nonetheless ultimately transcends these national fragmentations.
First, however, it is necessary to discuss the theoretical approach.
The »place-specific and embodied setting« (Novak 2017) of the informal economy
has a key role to play in the processes by which nationality is superseded by struc-
tural position. This consideration necessitates a theoretical perspective that takes into
account the contingent character of sociohistorical categories. Such a perspective can
be found in the situational turn in social anthropology. In response to the rigidity of
early 20th century structural approaches, theorists began to take into consideration the
manner in which individual behaviour was conditioned not only by overarching social
structures, but also by contingent situations and scenarios which constitute said struc-
tures (Gluckman 1940). Taken further, this perspective helped illuminate »the way in
which individuals actually handle their structural relationships and exploit elements
of choice between alternative norms according to the requirements of any particular
situation« (Van Helsen 1967: 148). This emphasis on the situational corresponded to
shifts in the analysis of ethnicity away from the naturalisation of ethnic groups, and
towards considerations of the fluidity of ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969). Okamura
(1981) made this link explicit in his discussion of »situational ethnicity«. These con-
ceptual frames have since facilitated shifts from discussions of »ethnic conflict« to-
ward »ethnically framed conflict« (Brubaker 2002), they have highlighted the power
role played by external categorisations in identity construction (Jenkins 2003), and
they have underscored the various ways in which ethnic boundaries are constructed,
challenged, and rearranged (Wimmer 2008). Such constructivist perspectives were
also soon applied to theories of nations and nationalism (Gellner 1983), with scholars
such as Anderson (1983) and Hobsbawm (1983) respectively discussing the nation as
an »imagined community«, and the role of »inventing tradition« within the national
project. The brief historical overview of ethnic and national identity construction in
Mauritania below draws on and corresponds to these perspectives. Moreover, the
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ethnographic analysis that follows illustrates the ongoing relevance of the situational
approach.
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION
IN MAURITANIA
The roots of modern ethnic and national group identity in Mauritania can be found
in the colonial era. The territories of what would become the nation-state of Mauri-
tania were first given cartographical expression in an 1899 plan for French colonial
expansion north of the Senegal River. The area delimited in the plan was named la
Mauritanie Occidentale (Coppolani 1999), in what Ould Mey (1996) believed to have
been a nostalgic allusion to the Roman Empire’s province of Mauretania. By naming
this territory with reference to its Arab-Berber inhabitants — »the Moors«1 — the
colonial administration formalised the narratives of its own knowledge production,
which tended to depict distinct modes of religious practice in operation on either side
the Senegal River: a ›black‹ Islam to the south and a ›Moorish‹ Islam to the north
(Robinson 2000). This conception also reflected balances of power and spheres of
influence at the turn of the 19th century. At this point in time, the Senegal River had
come to represent a dividing line in the minds of colonial administrators, between
›black‹ colonial subjects to the south and ›Moors‹ to the north who were yet to be
pacified (Ould Saad 2004: 97). It should come as little surprise, then, that following
the establishment of a protectorate in the southern territories of modern-day Mauri-
tania in 1902, the French government decreed that the line formed by the river was
to create the territorial demarcation between the administrative zones of Senegal and
Mauritania.
The implementation of a racialised, linear model of territoriality in a region charac-
terised by intense levels of internal mobility would bring about its own administrative
difficulties for colonial administrators. Following the drawing of the border, there
was a chronic outflow of black African Haalpulaar populations2 from the administra-
tive territory of Senegal to that of Mauritania, where the tax regime was somewhat
1 | Throughout this text, the term »Arab Moor« is used to refer to a group of people of Arab
and Berber origin that gradually came to constitute Mauritania’s upper class. The term »white
Moor« is also used, in accordance with how ethnic identity is colloquially expressed in Mau-
ritania, to further distinguish between the dominant group in Moorish society and the formerly
enslaved »black Moors«, or Haratin. Slavery still afflicts many of the rural poor in this group.
2 | The Haalpulaar are a black African ethnic group present across much of West Africa.
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more lenient. The solution to the resulting labour shortages was found in a further
classification of racial categories. In December 1905, the colonial administration de-
creed that all »indigènes of the black African race residing in Mauritanian territory«
(Colonial Administrator’s Report, quoted in Leservoisier 1994: 62) would hence-
forth be subject to the same tax regime as that of Senegal. From the point of view
of the colonial administration, then, cleaving a racial distinction within its Maurita-
nian territory appeared to be the most efficient means of extracting a surplus from
its subject populations. According to this decree, the Haalpulaar based north of the
Senegal River were deemed effectively tax resident in Senegal, despite their physi-
cal residence within the territory of Mauritania. This racialised exclusion of black
Africans from the proto-nation-state of Mauritania would resurface in dramatic form
over seventy years later, during the 1989 border conflict with Senegal, when thou-
sands of Afro-Mauritanians were deported from state territory alongside Senegalese
nationals. I will return to this point below.
Postcolonial national sovereignty
While the political significance of independence from colonialism cannot be under-
estimated, it necessarily entailed an institutionalisation of the very rationalities that
were introduced under colonial rule in the first place. The years following the im-
plosion of colonial authority in l’Afrique Occidentale Francaise saw the introduction
of a new national identity card across the region in 1949. As Gary-Tounkara (2009)
has observed, by specifying the ›race‹ of the card bearer, this new ID card would
reproduce the colonial imperative of dividing populations into ethnic subgroups (14).
Mauritanian nationality was established by Law 61-112 in June 1961, one year after
the country gained independence. The law set out the conditions of what would con-
stitute a Mauritanian national and the criteria for obtaining Mauritanian nationality in
detail (Di Bartolomeo/Fakhoury/Perrin 2010). Therefore, as with so many other post-
colonial contexts, independence from European colonialism would paradoxically be
asserted by means of what Agamben (1998) highlighted as the defining contradiction
of European modernity, namely the collapsing of natural life into the construct of the
nation-state, via the institution of citizenship. The exclusionary boundaries that this
model necessarily entails were given legal expression in Mauritania four years later,
with the passing of Law 65-046, which stipulated that foreign nationals who entered
the country irregularly would be punished with a two-month to two-year prison sen-
tence.
There were, however, two principal ways in which this exclusionary potential has
been mitigated in practice. The first was the establishment in 1973 of the Economic
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Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which triggered a regional impetus
supporting an area in which goods and persons could circulate freely. A range of bilat-
eral agreements have since been put in place to this end, and visa controls for citizens
of the participating member states were abolished in 1993. Mauritania withdrew from
ECOWAS in 1999 but maintained many of its bilateral agreements pertaining to free
movement. As such, in Mauritania, »nationals of the 15 member states, especially
Senegalese and Malians, continue, to varying degrees regulated by bilateral agree-
ments, to have privileged rights of access and residence« (Choplin/Lombard 2014:
71). The second mitigating factor has been the fact that for much of the history of the
Mauritanian nation-state, migration has been largely left to regulate itself informally,
with very little state oversight (Bensaâd 2008). Given the greater degrees of prole-
tarianisation in neighbouring colonies, inward migrant labour flows in the decades
following independence responded naturally to shortages in multiple nascent urban
industries, such as the fishing, mining, and transport sectors (Cross 2013). Much of
this labour was sourced and regulated by informal networks rather than official con-
tracts. Thus, while migrant »illegality« existed on paper since 1965 in Mauritania,
the aforementioned legal and structural factors meant that it only acquired a stringent
national exclusionary function much more recently, for reasons that will be discussed
shortly.
The lack of a substantive form of migrant »illegality« at this time of course did not
mean that other forms of discrimination and exclusion were absent from the Mauri-
tanian postcolonial landscape. In the years immediately following independence, the
state was principally led by those Arab-Moor tribal factions that had previously ac-
quiesced to colonial rule. Significant portions of the state bureaucracy were, however,
also occupied by members of black African communities, whose deeper integration
within the colonial administration meant that their level of linguistic competence ex-
ceeded that of many of their Arabic speaking compatriots (Marchesin 2010). By
the 1970s however, an elite-driven trend of »Arabisation« meant that greater sec-
tions of the state and upper ranks of the armed forces would come to be occupied
by Arab Moors. Educational policies also began to side-line the French language in
favour of Arabic (De Chassey 1984). Measures such as these served to exasperate
the sense of marginalisation amongst Mauritania’s black African populations, partic-
ularly amongst those who, due to their traditionally nomadic pastoral lifestyle, had
always existed at an administrative and social distance from the state, such as the Fula
(Ciavolella 2011).3
3 | The Fula are a subgroup within the Haalpulaar, distinguished from the sedentary majority
by their traditionally nomadic lifestyle.
206 | Hassan Ould Moctar
These identitarian schisms provided a readymade framework within which pro-
cesses of land expropriation that had been taking place in the 1980s in the Senegal
River Valley could be interpreted and acted upon (OECD 2010). In 1983, a new land
law abolished customary rights, and effectively facilitated the expropriation of many
Afro-Mauritanian groups living in the region in favour of large agricultural coopera-
tives, mostly run by Arab Moors whose presence there had grown following succes-
sive droughts in the 1970s. Tensions were further heightened in 1987 following an
attempted coup by Afro-Mauritanian members of the armed forces affiliated with a
self-described »multi-ethnic« black African separatist group. Grievances came to a
head in 1989, when what started out as a dispute over grazing rights betweenMaurita-
nian Fula herders and Senegalese farmers quickly escalated into a series of ethnically
framed attacks and reprisals across Senegal and Mauritania. Over the course of what
would come to be termed »the events«, »between 80,000 and 100,000 Mauritanians
were expelled from Senegal, and at least 70,000 Senegalese and other blacks were
expelled from Mauritania« (Tempest 1989: 3). The Mauritanian government denied
that its own citizens were among those deported, but the UNHCR claimed otherwise
(Parker 1991). An Afro-Mauritanian civil society leader described to me how his
mother and sister were deported to Senegal during »the events«, after being accused
of being Senegalese, despite their being in possession of Mauritanian papers (inter-
view, 7 March 2018). In such cases, accusations of being Senegalese served as a
rhetorical proxy for being of black African descent, which in turn was grounds for
expulsion beyond Mauritania’s territorial borders. Most of the Mauritanians expelled
were ethnic Fula. While the representation of the Senegal River as an ethnic dividing
line had initially been introduced during the colonial era, it was at this point firmly
implanted within postcolonial social structures.
The state’s spatial and embodied boundaries were further hardened by circum-
stances in 2006, when the Atlantic coast of Mauritania provided the setting for a brief
chapter in the ongoing crisis of European borders. In response to increasing numbers
of Sub-Saharan migrants leaving the northern port city of Nouadhibou for the Canary
Islands, the Spanish Government launched a military operation off the coasts of West
Africa, with the oversight of Frontex and in cooperation with Mauritanian authori-
ties. This ›cooperation‹ ended up resulting in the greatest number of expulsions from
state territory since »the events« of 1989, with 11,637 people being expelled from
Mauritania over the course of 2006 (Di Bartolomeo/Fakhoury/Perrin 2010). Hav-
ing succeeded in stemming the flow of undesirable people onto European shores, a
reconceptualisation of migration and border security took place in Mauritania. An
elaborate border management regime has since been developed, including the new
designation of 45 exclusive legal entry points into the country and the training of
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Mauritanian security personnel by international experts (Frowd 2014). So although
a linear logic of territoriality has informed the spatial demarcations of the Maurita-
nian state since its colonial inception in the early 20th century, it is only now in the
21st century that significant technological and practical resources are being devoted
to enacting this territorial integrity.
This hardening of the physical border is also apparent in its embodied form, as
evidenced by the introduction of a biometric identification system for citizens and
a concomitant residence permit for non-nationals in 2012. The biometric system
has opened up old wounds in Mauritanian society, with an Afro-Mauritanian group,
Touche Pas à Ma Nationalité (Hands Off My Nationality), claiming that the exclu-
sionary nature of the enrolment process amounted to a continuation of »the events«
by other means (Dia 2015). The residence permit for foreign nationals has been no
less contentious, as it has served as a new means by which the state can deport foreign
nationals from its territory (Dialtabé 2012) — which it has since been doing on a reg-
ular basis.4 From the point of view of the state, all of this represents a modernising
development. At a talk on the dynamics of migration in Mauritania delivered at a re-
gional trade union conference in Nouakchott, a state official admitted to being proud
of the recently installed biometric and residence permit systems, because »now, no
one is targeted because they are such and such. It’s because they haven’t respected
the law« (16 February 2018). Migrant community associations, however, claim that
the lengthy list of paperwork demanded of residence permit applicants effectively
pushes it out of reach for the vast majority of migrants in Mauritania. They also point
out that it is exclusively Sub-Saharan Africans who are subjected to raids and depor-
tations (interview, 26 February 2018). This would seem to indicate that older lines
of ethnic demarcation have not gone away, but have rather been disguised within the
putatively indiscriminate framework of a bureaucratic migration management system.
Whether by accident or design, the net effect of the biometric ID and residence
permit has been to situate many — both Mauritanians and non-nationals — outside
of the state’s purview. Before moving on to a discussion of ethnographic data, this
observation necessitates a further contextualisation of this informal space— in which
4 | It is difficult to come across recent statistics regarding deportations. Peregil (2015) stated
that the number of deportations carried out in 2014 was 6,463. Di Bartolomeo, Fakhoury
and Perrin (2010) put the number deported in 2007 at 6,634. A 2017 report produced by a
coalition of regional NGOs stated that 78 Senegalese citizens were deported in the month of July
2015 alone (Boulama et al. 2017). When I was in Rosso, a customs official and a Senegalese
policewoman both said that deportations occur on a daily basis.
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the protagonists of our discussion find themselves — and specifically this space’s
relationship to the urban environment of Nouakchott.
»The informal« in Nouakchott: urban social relations in practice
Nouakchott was a small fishing village of 200 people when it was chosen as the
budding nation’s capital city in 1958. In subsequent decades, however, Mauritania
would undergo a series of drastic interconnected transformations, which often saw
the state lagging behind seemingly self-perpetuating social processes. Between 1962
and 1975, the population of Nouakchott »grew from 7,750 to 103,483. By 1976 only
27 per cent of the [Mauritanian] population were still nomads compared with 78 per
cent in 1959; 31 per cent were urban dwellers compared with 6 per cent in 1959«
(Bennoune 1978: 46). These rural-urban migrations were further accelerated by dev-
astating droughts during the 1970s and 1980s, the result of which was huge growth
of informal shantytowns on the periphery of the city (Choplin 2009). By 2015, the
urban population had grown to over 1 million, representing 48% of the national popu-
lation, of whom just 1.9% were still nomadic (République Islamique de la Mauritanie
2015). Within a remarkably short timeframe, then, the social relations and structures
of a modern urban society emerged from communities long characterised by nomadic
pastoralism and sedentary agriculture.
The transformative effects of these local climatic and social processes of urbanisa-
tion and sedentarisation were further impelled by the global economic context of the
1980s and early 1990s. Structural adjustment programmes implemented by the Mau-
ritanian state under the tutelage of the World Bank and the IMF entailed recurring
currency devaluations, the opening up of numerous sectors to foreign international
investment, and the general rolling back of the state (Ould Mey 1996). Cross (2011)
argues that this »neoliberal economic reform rapidly projected Mauritanian popula-
tions into the monetary economy and gave rise to a strong informal sector« (832).
As has been illustrated in other African contexts, deeper integration into global eco-
nomic processes can occur in conjunction with the marginalisation, subordination,
and outright exclusion of local workers (Meagher/Mann/Bolt 2016). This informal
sector remains the primary feature of the Mauritanian labour market today, with the
Office of National Statistics reporting in 2017 that 91.5% of those employed in the
non-agricultural private sector are working informally (République Islamique de la
Mauritanie 2017). While it is difficult to come by reliable statistics regarding the pro-
portion of migrants employed in this sector, it is widely acknowledged that the vast
majority work informally (IOM 2009: 16; République Islamique de la Mauritanie
2010: 29). A similar prevalence of »the informal« can be observed in the domain
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of urban property, which Choplin (2006) describes as a »rationalised informal sec-
tor« (p. 90). This characterisation describes how social codes and networks which
are informal nonetheless operate according to discernible principles, facilitating new
patterns of wealth accumulation in Mauritania.
Given its sheer ubiquity as well as its manner of reflecting and reproducing power
differentials, it may be useful to think of informality in the context of Nouakchott
simply as urban social relations in practice. Such a definition corresponds to McFar-
lane’s conceptualisation of formality and informality as practices, insofar as it also
strives to analyse informality »taking place not above or in advance of urban life, but
within its unfolding« (McFarlane 2012: 101). It also draws on Scott’s seminal critique
of the modern state project, which he argued to be inherently and fatally incapable of
fully integrating the »illegible« forms of local knowledge and practice onto which it
is superimposed (Scott 1998). The following ethnographic analysis, however, should
illustrate that informality in the context under consideration is best viewed neither
as a practice in itself, nor as an outlier of an otherwise seamless state surveillance
system. Rather, it is the material site in which the historically endowed categories
and social hierarchies discussed above are reproduced and, at times, recast, on the
ground. This analytical lens will now be deployed to assess the interplay between
ethnicity, nationality and class position in this setting.
NATIONALITY, ETHNICITY AND URBAN INFORMALITY
IN NOUAKCHOTT
A word on method
The data presented in the following section of this article was conducted within the
framework of doctoral field research. All exchanges, observations and interviews
cited here took place between October 2017 and August 2018. The majority of these
were in French, although some also occurred in the Mauritanian dialect of Arabic
known as Hassaniya. All exchanges and quotes cited emerged within the context
of ethnographic field observations. This methodological approach immediately ap-
peared most appropriate to researching the informal economy for two principal rea-
sons. First, it offered an opportunity to directly observe dynamics between authority
figures and workers in the informal sector, as well as that among different commu-
nities in this setting. This first-hand perspective would not have been available had
I chosen to conduct interviews with participants elsewhere. Secondly, as the son of
a Mauritanian national of »White Moor« background, my presence in the various
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sites of the informal economy would often initially elicit inquiries about whether I
was looking to hire workers. Undoing this perception and establishing an alternative
perspective seemed imperative for both ethical and methodological reasons. In this
regard, leading individuals away from the sites of the informal economy to conduct a
formal interview elsewhere would, in my judgement, have done the research process
more harm than good.
Notes on Nouakchott’s informal economy
In a dusty public square in the upper-class neighbourhood of Tevregh Zeina in north-
central Nouakchott, people shelter themselves from sun and sand as they wait out the
days in search of sparse and precarious employment. The high, barbed-wire-adorned
walls of the French embassy loom behind a roundabout on the west side of the square,
a permanent, ominous fixture for those based here. The square is also flanked on
the north by a large expensive apartment complex — home mostly to international
military and diplomatic staff — and a newly constructed hotel. Numerous people
here have recounted to me in detail how the owner of the hotel enlisted the police
and the municipality to clear them out of the square while he was constructing it in
2016. Several were deported to Rosso-Senegal during these raids. The building was
then left empty and unused for over a year, seemingly forgotten by its owner. But
the mass expulsion he instigated is still fresh in the minds of everyone here, serving
as a turning point in their relationship to this particular place. As illustrated by other
examples of the struggles of Nouakchott’s urban poor (Choplin 2014b, 2014a; Vium
2016), the crux of antagonism between the state and the disenfranchised here lies
in the contestation of public space. On the south side of the square is the walled-off
perimeter of Nouakchott’s only church, in whose shade many of the unemployed pass
the hours of the day. To those in the informal economy functioning here, the square
and its surroundings is simply known as the Church.
As a labour pick-up point, the Church offers insight into the schisms between those
with and without resources in Mauritanian society. Those who are gathered here are
principally Malians, Guineans, and Mauritanian Fula and Haratin. The only miss-
ing component of the mosaïque mauritanienne (Schmitz 1994) is the »white Moor«,
who only ever makes an appearance in the capacity of a prospective employer or the
occasional wandering street vendor. When cars periodically pull up looking to hire
someone, a large crowd will gather, with people often pushing past one another to
get into it to haggle prices. This is typically how people find employment as domes-
tic workers in Nouakchott. The vast disparity between supply and demand in this
economy means that the majority remain unemployed on each occasion. However,
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the desperation born of this disparity can also result in the employer driving away
empty-handed, a frustrated reaction to the chaotic scenes that his presence inevitably
brings about. Alongside those waiting in hope of winning the scramble to get a job as
a domestic worker are those who come to the Church to wash cars and tint windows.
They typically spend the day standing at the roundabout under the austere gaze of
the embassy walls, brandishing their materials at passing cars. When they succeed in
attracting a customer, they direct them around the corner to an alley behind the south
wall of the church, the site of their informal car washing operation.
Before the property owner deployed the authorities of the state against these mi-
grant workers, they were free to carry out their business in the square itself. Cheikh, a
Guinean Fula, recounted to me how things were a lot easier before the police pushed
them out of the square. He was among those deported to Rosso-Senegal at this time,
but he found his way back within a few days, thanks to the unorthodox business prac-
tices of Rosso border police. »If you have money you don’t have a problem«, he
explained. »The police down there are looking for money. They’re men of the law
but they do business as well.« At this point, Karim, another car washer, chimed in:
»They look for money illegally. We’re trying to get money legally and we’re worn
out!« The zone of indistinction between formal and informal business practices to
which Karim alludes here is further underscored by the fact that bribes and unofficial
charges at Rosso— and other border crossings in Mauritania — are typically referred
to as »les formalités«. This ambiguity between »the formal« and »the informal« also
arises in relation to the state’s initial act of clearing out the public square at the request
of a private property owner. The question of why »some instances of informality are
designated as illegal and their inhabitants criminalised while other land transforma-
tions appear to be protected and formalised to enjoy state sanction or even endorsed
as practices of the state« (MacLeod/Jones 2011: 2452) thus appears to be of interest
here. This conundrum is resolved, however, once we view informality as nothing
other than the practice of urban social relations, with all of the power dynamics that
they entail.
Like most other people here, Cheikh is working to provide money for his fam-
ily back home in Guinea. Here, Mauritanian nationals and migrant workers alike
have family connections in rural areas of their respective regions. Talk of the family
back home in »the village« is common. Informality notwithstanding, then, this ur-
ban pocket of economic activity plays a role in sustaining livelihoods in diverse parts
of West Africa, both within Mauritania’s borders and further abroad. It also gen-
erates further economic activity in the locale of the Church itself. Migrant women
from various West African backgrounds come here each day to serve lunch in the
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form of a plate of the Senegalese rice dish Thiéboudienne for 400 ougiyas.5 Gen-
dered social roles and relations are thus reproduced in the informal economy. The
day is also punctuated at regular intervals by the regional delicacy of mint tea. All of
this is facilitated by people — both migrants and Mauritanians — who come to the
Church each day to set up shop in response to demand from workers here. Informality
thus produces further informality, from which social rituals and networks inevitably
emerge. These are at times disrupted by municipality officials, who arrive to confis-
cate cleaning materials and insist that people take their business elsewhere. Where
exactly this ought to be has never been made clear. During the time I spent here, such
disruptions never reached the intensity of the fabled 2016 raid. At moments of high
frequency, however, they can push the cost of services up. Around the time of the
2018 African Union Summit in Nouakchott, for example, car washers told me they
had begun charging customers 1,000 ougiyas instead of 500, due to the near-constant
pressure from the municipality.
Further examples of urban social relations in practice play out on a daily basis
roughly 2 km south of the Church, in an area known as Clinique. The majority
of workers I encountered here are from Senegal. They assemble on both sides of
the road leading to Clinique’s hectic intersection, calling out to passing potential
employers. The shops on each side of the road deal mostly in construction, plumbing
and electrical supplies, which are also the areas in which the unemployed multitude
attempt to find work as day labourers. Sharing the crowded pavement with them
are numerous street vendors hawking clothes, sunglasses, jewellery, headphones, and
traditional drinks and snacks. Some have resorted to this form of petit-commerce in
frustration at the chronic unemployment within the construction and domestic work
sectors. This was the case for Boubacar, a Senegalese Fula who had been seeking
day labour as a painter when I first got to know him. One day I arrived in Clinique to
find that he had swapped his paintbrush and roller for a small selection of perfumes,
which he had laid out in a display on the curb. He explained that after finding no
more than 3 days’ painting work over the space of a month, he opted to switch to
street vending. This proved to be a risky decision, however.
Just as car washers by the Church need to be ready to hide their materials to avoid
them being confiscated by the municipality, similar contestations over public space
unfold on a daily basis in Clinique and other parts of the city centre. It was a com-
mon occurrence to observe gendarmes forcing people selling products to pack them
up and move on. The very fact that this is a more or less daily routine illustrates that
5 | Ougiya is the local currency in Mauritania. 400 ougiyas was roughly equal to 1 euro at the
time of this research.
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it fails manifestly in its stated purpose of permanently clearing the streets of Clin-
ique of street vendors. It does, nonetheless, produce a deeply disruptive effect in the
lives of people here, rendering business at times impossible, and thereby increasing
the precarity in which they live. Street vendors have told me that they believe a new
shopping centre development just north of Clinique to lie behind the increased hos-
tility of gendarmes in their regard of late.6 The urban African struggles observed by
Cooper (1983) between migrant labour, capital and the state, and their consequences
in the domains of public space and migrant life, are thus very much in play in this
context. If street vendors refuse to pack up their materials, or even if they fail to do
so quickly enough, the products will be confiscated. This had already happened to
Boubacar on a number of occasions in the short time that he had been in this business.
For him, the stark survival choice was between idle invisibility in unemployment or
throwing himself into the crosshairs of the municipality.
This is a situation in which many, both national and non-national, find themselves
in Nouakchott. Notwithstanding this commonality of position amongst Nouakchott’s
multinational urban poor, however, there are cleavages among those on the margins
of the state.
Urban informality and national fragmentation
One day I was sitting in the alley behind the Church chatting with two car wash-
ers: a Malian Soninké called Yousef, and a Mauritanian Fula named Moussa. The
two agreed that Mauritania is a hostile place to be poor, but opinions diverged when
Moussa claimed that black Mauritanians were disenfranchised by »White Moors«.
Yousef was sceptical about the plight of Afro-Mauritanians, claiming that »they’re
not real Mauritanians«. In doing so, he reproduced the same racialised exclusionary
conception of the nation that underpins black Afro-Mauritanian grievances against
the state. While Yousef and Moussa identify with separate ethnic groups, it is clearly
nationality that constitutes the point of antagonism between them, since true mem-
bership of the Mauritanian nation is what is at stake in the exchange. A similar theme
emerged on another occasion, when I observed a disagreement between a Guinean
Fula named Ahmed and a Mauritanian Fula called Khaled. Ahmed was telling me
about the difficulties of life here, saying that things are very hard for foreigners. »Not
just for foreigners!« Khaled angrily interjected, and protested that Mauritanians had
difficulties too. The insinuation that hardship was the exclusive domain of migrants
6 | Local media have reported on similar disputes between market workers and municipality
officials over the same shopping centre development (N’Diaye 2017).
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in Nouakchott had sparked indignation in the Mauritanian Fula. For him the root
of their situation was not a matter of simply being ›foreign‹. Evidently, the fact of
Ahmed’s and Khaled’s shared ethnic identification did not preclude nationally-based
differences from arising between them.
A conversation with Boubacar, the Senegalese Fula painter turned street ven-
dor, may further illuminate how nationality cuts through ethnic affiliation. After
an Afro-Mauritanian walked away from his perfume display without buying any-
thing, Boubacar returned to leaning on a car beside me, complaining about the Fulas
in Mauritania:
»They’re worth nothing here. They’re behind. And they always give for-
eigners a hard time. They say that foreigners have ruined the country.
They say that this is their country, but it’s not their country! They only
collect rubbish and that type of thing. And they give us a hard time.«
When I inquired if they give him a hard time because they themselves are also having
a hard time, he responded that yes, »they are having a hard time«. He then continued
to decry their attitudes to foreigners. »But you speak the same language, don’t you?«
I asked. »We’re brothers!« he affirmed, »but they give us a hard time.«7 Boubacar’s
words indicated the extent to which the colonial administrative decision to draw a
territorial border between people living on opposite banks of the Senegal River has
resonated in psycho-social terms up to today. Such sentiments have been echoed to
me from the ›national‹ side of this divide as well. Youslem, a Mauritanian Fula, told
me how he used to earn between 60,000 and 70,000 ougiyas a month as a domestic
worker when he first arrived in Nouakchott from his home region of Kaedi. Now,
however, domestic workers only earn between 25,000 and 30,000. He blamed mi-
grants for this. They work for nothing, he argued, and as a result, »they have ruined
everything«.
Boubacar’s observations about the structural position of the Fula in Mauritania is
not without basis in fact, and it may offer some insight into what underlies these an-
tagonisms. Ciavolella (2010) chose the Fula ethnic group as his object of study in
what he termed an »anthropology of the margins« of the Mauritanian state. For him,
looking at the state from the perspective of its peripheral groups could provide unique
insights into its very nature. From our point of view, the fact that certain Mauritanian
nationals face systemic marginalisation alongside migrant labourers speaks to a lack
of what Brubaker (2010) has referred to as »substantive citizenship« in Mauritania.
Some may also even lack the »formal citizenship« with which he juxtaposes it, as
7 | Originally »Ils nous fatiguent« in French.
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suggested by those Afro-Mauritanian groups that claimed the biometric ID system
was intended to strip them of their citizenship (Antil/Lesourd 2012). The gravity
of such a relegation to the periphery of belonging, and the meagre distribution of re-
sources that exists there, goes some way to explaining antagonisms between nationals
and non-nationals in the informal economy.
The familiar, tragic irony of this situation is the similarity of experience that unites
those who blame one another for their condition. At separate instances, both Youslem
and aMalian named Bakar recounted to me the exact same feelings of frustration, iso-
lation, and powerlessness associated with domestic work. Both spoke of feelings of
emasculation due to having to take orders from children, and both said that without
patience, you can’t last in the job. If the employment of domestic workers facilitates
status reproduction for employers, as Bridget Anderson (2003) has observed, the sta-
tus of the worker is also certainly reproduced in the process. Yet this common class
position and its experiential bonds are fractured by the national/other divide. It must
be emphasised that this subjective psychological identification with the »imagined
community« of the nation (Anderson 1983; Finlayson 1998) takes on a concrete, ma-
terial form here. Youslem once sat beside me in a bad mood after trying his luck in
the crowd that had gathered around a car at the Church. »The guy said he doesn’t hire
Mauritanians,« he told me dejectedly. His begrudging of foreign nationals is there-
fore grounded in his experience. And from the point of view of migrants, in addition
to the exclusionary function of the residence permit, a recent series of national ring-
fencing measures has meant that it is no longer officially possible for them to obtain
formal employment in sectors such as transport and fishing (Diop 2013; Undercurrent
News 2017). The formal sector is further closed off by the fact that work permits can
only be obtained if the job to which one is applying cannot be filled by a Mauritanian
national (République Islamique de la Mauritanie 2010). Such policies further expand
the pool of informal labour, pushing wages down and thus raising the potential for
antagonistic social relations in this arena.
State coercion and social cohesion
Considering these policy-forged cleavages between those on the peripheries of the
state, it is worth concluding with a reflection on why there is not more antipathy here.
After all, competition is an iron law of the labour market, all the more so — one
might expect — when it is an informal one. What one finds just as often, however, is
a solidarity of necessity. There are at least two reasons for this. At the most funda-
mental level, the daily social interactions and exchanges around mint, sugar, tea and
cigarettes in the various sites of the informal economy make up the strands of social
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fabric that ensure a minimal degree of coexistence. In the context ofWest Africa, such
social interactions are facilitated by what Whitehouse (2012) has referred to as the
system of inter-ethnic joking relationships that exists across the region. Mauritania’s
geo-cultural location may thus provide some explanation as to why the phenomenon
of »strangerhood«, which Whitehouse uses to describe the position of West African
migrants in Brazzaville, Congo, has not manifested itself as profoundly between mi-
grants and nationals in Nouakchott. Everyday mundane exchanges such as those
identified by Whitehouse can be linked to the routines that Purcell (2003), drawing
on Lefebvre, identified as constituting an alternative mode of urban belonging, which
he describes as »inhabitance«. It is the very fact of »inhabitance«, in his view, that
justifies the right to the city, rather than the exclusionary income-based model that
dominates urban settings in which capitalist private property relations prevail. Ev-
idently, Nouakchott is one such setting, which means that the informal economy is
anything but immune to this overarching capitalist framework. Indeed, car washers
have on occasion lamented to me the lack of organised unity among them, which can
result in wage undercutting. Nonetheless, such practices do not preclude what White-
house (2012) calls the »pattern of ritualized informal ties« (p. 16), which arises from
daily social interactions in a shared urban space.
Secondly, the hostility of state authorities toward those in the informal sector adds
impetus to the solidarity of necessity identified here. Amidst rumours of an im-
pending police raid at the Church (which ultimately never materialised), car wash-
ers banded together, passing their water cans to one another and hiding them behind
the wall of another empty property so as to avoid them being confiscated. And in
Clinique, petit-commercants will often warn one another when gendarmes arrive to
perform a sweep and confiscate belongings. The manner in which this positioning
vis-à-vis state authority forges social cohesion may be further illuminated through
an exchange with Alex, a Mauritanian Fula car washer at the Church. Like so many
others, he was telling me about how foreigners have ruined the labour market here.
When I responded to his assertions with surprise, by observing that everyone at the
Church seemed to get on rather well, he replied that
»Yes, everyone gets on with each other, because if you have a good heart
and you behave yourself you won’t have any problems. But if we come
here and fight amongst ourselves, then that will bring problems with the
police and all of that.«
According to Alex, then, there is a collective self-interest in maintaining a degree of
social cohesion, as anything less would jeopardise the security of all. To put this in
situational terms, the sociohistorical structures of ethnicity and nationality certainly
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offer rhetorical formats of exclusion and frameworks of resentment to individuals in
the informal economy. However, their capacity to constitute substantive social barri-
ers between workers is checked by the relationship between those in the informal sec-
tor and the state. What appears anomalous according to what one might expect from
the exclusionary structures of ethnicity and nationality is explainable by reference
to the relationship of the municipality and the police to individuals in the informal
economy. As Papadopoulos and Tsianos observed, »where migrants and precarious
workers meet is in sharing the same urban spaces« (2013: 189), and in this case, in
the state repression to which this sharing of urban space exposes them.
It is crucial to acknowledge that in the abstract, the line between national and other
is manifestly evident in the form that state reprisals may take, insofar as non-nationals
are »deportable« (De Genova 2002), while nationals are not. In practice, however, the
persistence of ethnically based modes of discrimination means that Mauritanian Fula
and Haratin are not immune from arbitrary arrest and discrimination. And on the
other hand, an undocumented migrant may avoid deportation at the cost of a bribe
to police, as several respondents attested to me. Moreover, a corruption scandal in
Nouakchott’s migrant detention centre in 2016 led to a temporary lull in migrant de-
tention and deportation (Sileye 2016). These considerations indicate that the extent
to which the line between »deportable« non-nationals and »non-deportable« citizens
manifests in practice depends on contingent contextual factors. This further under-
scores the situational nature of nationality and ethnicity. Furthermore, while the simi-
lar experience of certain Afro-Mauritanians and West African migrants regarding the
biometric ID card and residence permit may serve to sharpen antagonisms between
those on the margins of the state, it could equally heighten a sense of collective ex-
clusion, which can in turn foster a shared sense of grievance, if not identity.
CONCLUSION
Created ex nihilo in 1958 (Bensaâd 2008), Nouakchott today serves as the setting
for a daily cyclical routine, in which gendarmes, police, and municipality officials,
tasked with arranging urban space in the image of capital and the state, are set against
migrant street vendors and workers trying to eke out an existence in this same urban
space. The collective survival impulse of the latter is the ultimate operating principle
of those segments of the informal economy discussed here. This is a world that peo-
ple have entered having travelled, either internally or across borders, in the hope of
gaining a living. Cheikh summed this up when speaking to me about continuing to
work with the threat of their materials being confiscated: »everyone does what they
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can to survive.« As Locatelli and Nugent (2008) stated in relation to other African ur-
ban contexts, the strategies that arise from this survival impulse should be understood
»as capacities built upon people’s perceptions of their own status and experiences
of their daily life« (4). The universally informal nature of the social networks and
economic activity discussed here, as well as that of the state disruptions to which
they are subject, indicate that what is often labelled ›informality‹ can equally be de-
scribed in Nouakchott as urban social relations in practice. The historical baggage
of national categories and identities can and does provide the content for situational
displays of identity in this urban context. However, it is superseded by the position of
those within the informal economy, who are internally bound together by social ritu-
als and patterns of communication, and externally by a shared structural antagonism.
This makes the informal economy, for the moment, a more immediate and tangible
alternative mode of belonging.
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